I am very sympathetic to existentialist phenomenology today. At least I look for an ontology of non-static, a kinetic of being as “something that comes” to the world. The central idea of all existentialist thinking is that existence precedes essence. There is no God who has planned man, and therefore there is no fixed human nature to which man should respect. Man is totally free is the only responsible for what makes of himself (Sartre and some others). First we exist, and only then do we constitute the essence through our actions in the world. Then nothing can ever be explained having as its starting point a given and definitive human nature. There is no sort of essentialist determinism. Existentialism, in this way, places man in total responsibility for what he is. But at the same time, it is strange to think that existence is something individual or the liberal view of man. It would change to: “coexistence precedes existence”. We would have to see in operation a passage from the being-there of existential philosophies to a (be-with) relatable. An interpenetrate. A kind of solidarity that excludes the rest of the world. However, being free means being among friends. “Freedom” and “friend” have the same root in the Indo-European. Freedom is, fundamentally, a relational word. Curiously, too, Marx defines freedom as a successful relationship with the other. Individual freedom represents to Marx a cunning, a trap of capital. “Free competition or free competition”, which rests on the idea of individual freedom, is only “the relation of capital to itself as another capital, that is to say, the actual behavior of capital as capital.” "Only within the community with others does the individual have the necessary means to develop his gifts in every way; only within the community is it possible, therefore, personal freedom "(German Ideology).
On all the considerations so far shows that Kant’s definition of space as a possibility of being together must be replaced by a doctrine which is this: being together is what makes space possible. The so-studied theological and metaphysical notion of the trinity (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) comes into the world in a way to rebut Newton and his idea that each body occupies its space and that two bodies can not occupy the same space simultaneously, , the Trinity with the idea of shared space, interpenetrating, symbiosis, perichoresis. The three are in themselves and at the same time in the other two. A type of alliance, therefore, always in a “three in one”. This is the first theological theory about how three things can coexist in the same place.
That from the beginning there are intertwined particles that are never alone. With psychoanalysis, we have the individualistic fallacy that individuals and atoms are the last particles from which the world is made. But that goes too far. We need to take on a more “molecular” basic layer. If we move from the molecule to the atom, we lose sight of what we are trying to analyze. An empty atom can not tell you anything. In the end, Kant, in his time, was aware that reason itself was modeled on orientation in space. Only he takes space as static and not with an analytic of kinetic place. From nonexistence to existence and that “points to nonexistence”. The “being-in-the-world” comes to a “furniture of the world”, however, with the ontological narrative we must understand that the world is not a furniture populated by pieces already in advance constituted. The world is populated by that constant movement, which travels, transits between the elements, but not as something immutable, but as something that transits along with the transition, something that moves in itself, transforming itself as it changes in space and in time. Not “being-in-the-world”, but rather, “being-entering-the-world”. An analysis of the place as “coming to the world”, that is, an old notion coming from the tradition of Socrates and a cosmology. Instead of substance, why not think of relationships? A dose of pragmatism always brings thought to action and the future (utopia - Dewey’s prophecy or Rorty’s hope). It is not the world that speaks, it is we who speak. Gasset will speak of the man conceived as existing and this does not separate from the world. Foucault treats the body as space and place, that is, the body would be the opposite of a utopia as it speaks in “The Utopian Body”. It also reinforces this view Merleau-Ponty when speaking that the body is not in space, lives in it. Any thing, entity or entity exist, therefore, they are. What it is is, we have an ontological condition for each entity.
But then you could ask what it is, it’s … what? This is already a direction of the being of each being for the being, the horse is the horse, the stone is the stone (the being for each being). There the being comes in as a verb not of connection or predication, but as an ontological existence. All beings are, therefore, have to be, but all beings to be are something, deny the being and end up being “being something”, when we work with the furniture of the world we have the beings, but when we work with the condition of the entities we work with being, is (the difference of ontic and ontological). This is how Heidegger works when he says about the “forgetfulness of Being” and when he says that “Only a God can save us” referring to the growing scientific-technical that would in turn annul the Being of the beings.
If we look at Goethe’s Faustian drama we shall see that it is a Hegelian logic of the world and history, the logic of evolution, the logic of the positive dialectic that promises a constructive definition. Such a model of thought establishes a new era of metaphysical speculation. The world moves and its movement points forward and upward. The evil of the ages appears in these circumstances as the necessary price of evolution, leading us from dark beginnings, hidden to radiant objects. Here lies the philosophical status with Faust. At the point where traditional metaphysics stumbles, in the interpretation of evil in the world, as the Christian background of this metaphysics pales with its salvation optimism, art comes to fill that gap. Mephistopheles as the central figure of modern aesthetics, is a son of the idea of evolution, through which the age-old questions of theodicy and the fugacity of phenomena can be formulated in the eighteenth century in a new way and answered with a new logic. What is certain is that evil in the world, from that time, death, destruction, contamination, negativity can no longer be interpreted as punitive intervention or trials of God in human history as did the ancient Christians. And Enlightenment is not just a theory of light. It is, above all, a theory of movement towards the optical, dynamic light of the theory of evolution. Theories of evolution enter into and introduce the metaphysical inheritance in the sciences. Only they have the strength to integrate, in a comprehensive perspective, evil, decay, death and pain as a burden of living beings. Evolution as progress is modern theodicy. It authorizes the last logical interpretation of negativity, since in the evolutionist’s place we have what must suffer and what perishes, modern intellectual cynicism already puts its hands on the game so that the dead can be the fertilizer of the future. The death of others appears to him as a premise, both ontological and logical, of the success of his projects and of “his own cause.” The devil is not just an evolutionist, but he is also a nominalist. “Evil” understands itself in another way. It is seen as a “force”, as a phenomenon of energy, as a position in a polarity of nature. The devil is the first post-Christian realist. And if we subtract the horn and the legs from Mephistopheles there is nothing left but a bourgeois philosopher realistic, antimetaphysical, empiricist, positivist. It is not by chance that Faust, the incarnation of the modern researcher from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, struck a pact with such a devil.
Going to the work of Sartre called Between Four Walls, we have Inês character of the story that says "Ora! I know what I’m saying. I do not need a mirror. " In this, Estelle asks: "Do not you have a mirror? (Garcin does not respond). A mirror, a pocket mirror, anyone? (Garcin does not respond). Since you’re leaving me alone, at least try to find a mirror. (Garcin continues with her head in her hands, without answering.) Ines asks, “What do you have?” Estelle adds, “I’m feeling weird.” (She palms herself.) Does not that happen to you? , I need to feel myself to know if I’m really there. “Inês ends: You’re lucky, I always perceive myself from within.” The characters’ preoccupation with the self and the mirrors gives us the hint that the two would function as mirror in the other.No mirror will be more faithful than Ines.In hell and without mirrors, only looking into the eyes of others is that it would be possible to see.We would be closer there not to a narcissism or a “theory of mirrors” of Lacan , but of a Hegelian theory of recognition or phenomenology combined with the positivity society of which Han speaks in his works that in the contemporary scenario the other would be eliminated (or even if he encounters what Pascal and Hume denounced, the self as alhe or to any essence or content of its own).
Many take the mirror as merely an occasional decoration. Many do not realize that it is he, the mirror, who is at the center of contemporary life, that we look more into it than anything else during the day, even in the black mirrors. We want an answer from the mirror at all times. We can not get rid of him. Looking at yourself in the mirror every morning is something very recent within our customs. But we act on our considerations of ourselves as if from the caves we have done this, that of cultivating the practice of looking in the mirror. Lacan fell into this error of naturalizing the “mirror stage” into something narcissistically. Lacan’s hybrid theorem as the maker of the function of the Self can overcome his dependence on this familiar nineteenth-century cosmetic or egotechnical tool to the great prejudice of those who have been overshadowed by this psychological mirage. We have the myth of Narcissus, which rightly should not be read as an indication of a natural relationship of the human being with his disturbing strangeness of facial reflection. It is not a coincidence that the story is transmitted by Ovid. Looking at this we have to keep in mind that the eye and the face or the face and the subject and the face-object were placed in relation to each other in a new way. Narcissus wanted to hug his face in the mirror of the water, but for a reason: this one had not yet noticed, for him, his own face. His fall into the reflection allows us to think that until then, every face that appeared in sight should be the face of the other. Narcissistic misfortune is nothing more than an accident of self-reflection. A face that shows itself, that is, is a charming face, whether it be the face itself is something inadmissible before the appearance of reflection. Previously in Alcebíades, we had one of the first figures in the European tradition whose characterization shows traces of a facial aesthetic consciousness applied to its own case. Socrates decides to circumvent the vanity of his pupil, making him remain still on his beautiful face, the one of Alcebíades, to address not in the face, but in his soul. For the Greeks, the mirrors remain something unique to women. The Greek man can only have experiences of his aspect through the vision of the other. The initial experience of faciality consists in the fact that humans who look at human beings are looked at by human beings, and from the gaze of the other, they turn to themselves. The basis of Greek philosophy, the academy. . That is why Socrates is important, because he asked it to be done: the game of living thought. A “method” that he became well known for. That is why Socrates, in Plato’s Phaedrus, made it clear why he did not write books. The book always gives the same answer. The book is important, but it never contradicts, never reacts, never exalts. The book is limited in the work of creating. The book is not surprising. The book is not the living reasoning that catches the interlocutor to require him to reformulate, to re-create, to recreate. Only the other, the interlocutor can create what is fundamental to the reasoning that trains philosophizing: contradiction. That is exactly what the elenkhós, the “method of refutation.” Philosophy was born of an activity of confraternity of friends, a place of the elect, chosen, a field called skholé - the school.
